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Iran's
'Stolen' Election: a Hardline Demagouge's Victory Over a 'Reformer'?
Not So Fast
By Phil Wilayto, AlterNet
June 14,
2009
As this is
being written, official announcements in Iran today of a landslide
victory by incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are being met
with cries of “fraud” by supporters of his principal
challenger, former Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi.
The New York
Times is reporting that “at least one person had been shot
dead in clashes with the police in Vanak Square in Tehran. Smoke
from burning vehicles and tires hung over the city late Saturday.”
It seems
clear which side has started the violence. From Sunday''s Times:
“'Death
to the coup d’état!' chanted a surging crowd of several
thousand protesters, many of whom wore Mr. Moussavi’s [sic]
signature bright green campaign colors, as they marched in central
Tehran on Saturday afternoon. 'Death to the dictator!' Farther
down the street, clusters of young men hurled rocks at a phalanx
of riot police officers, and the police used their batons to beat
back protesters. There were reports of demonstrations in other
major Iranian cities as well. ... As night settled in, the streets
in northern Tehran that recently had been the scene of pre-election
euphoria were lit by the flames of trash fires and blocked by
tipped trash bins and at least one charred bus. Young men ran
through the streets throwing paving stones at shop windows, and
the police pursued them.”
(Note: Northern
Tehran is the more affluent part of the city. There were no reports
of protest in the much poorer southern part of the capital.)
While there's
still time to rationally look at the elections, I'd like to offer
a few observations.
The dominant
view among Western commentators, as well as some progressive members
of the Iranian diaspora, is that Mousavi is a "reformer"
who favors loosening restrictions on civil liberties within Iran,
while being more open to a less hostile relationship with the
West. Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, is described as a "hardliner"
who demagogically appeals to the poor, while making deliberately
provocative statements about the United States and Israel in order
to bolster his standing in the Islamic world.
In my opinion,
both of the above characterizations are superficial. The fundamental
contradiction between the two leading candidates has to do with
their respective bases of support and, more importantly, their
different approaches to the economy.
Ahmadinejad,
himself born into rural poverty, clearly has the support of the
poorer classes, especially in the countryside, where nearly half
the population lives. Why? In part because he pays attention to
them, makes sure they receive some benefits from the government
and treats them and their religious views and traditions with
respect. Mousavi, on the other hand, the son of an urban merchant,
clearly appeals more to the urban middle classes, especially the
college-educated youth. This being so, why would anyone be surprised
that Ahmadinejad carried the vote by a clear majority? Are there
now more yuppies in Iran than poor people?
Why is there
so little discussion of the issue of class in this election? Is
it because so many professional and semi-professional commentators
on Iran are themselves from the same class as Mousavi's supporters,
and so instinctively identify with them? Myself, I'm a worker,
and a former union organizer. When I watched the videos and viewed
the photos of the pro-Mousavi rallies in Tehran and other cities,
I didn't feel elated – I felt a chill. To me, this didn't
look like a liberal reform movement, it felt like a movement whose
real target is a government that exercises a "preferential
option for the poor," to use the words of Christian liberation
theology.
How about
the economy?
A big issue
in Iran -- virtually never discussed in the U.S. media -- is how
to interpret Article 44 of the country's constitution. That article
states that the economy must consist of three sectors: state-owned,
cooperative and private, and that "all large-scale and mother
industries" are to be entirely owned by the state. This includes
the oil and gas industries, which provide the government with
the majority of its revenue. This is what enables the government,
in partnership with the large charity foundations, to fund the
vast social safety net that allows the country's poor to live
much better lives than they did under the U.S.-installed Shah.
In 2004,
Article 44 was amended to allow for some privatization. Just how
much, and how swiftly that process should proceed, is a fundamental
dividing line in Iranian politics. Mousavi has promised to speed
up the privatization process. And when he first announced he would
run for the presidency, he called for moving away from an “alms-based
“ economy (PressTV, 4/13/09), an obvious reference to Ahmadinejad's
policies of providing services and benefits to the poor.
In addition
to their different class bases and approaches to the economy,
Ahmadinejad presents an uncompromising front against the West,
and especially against the U.S. government. This is a source of
great national pride, and has produced some positive results.
For example, President Obama has now actually admitted, at least
in part, that it was the U.S. that in 1953 overthrew the democratically
elected government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh.
The whole
idea that tossing Ahmadinejad out of office would make it easier
to change U.S. policy toward Iran is, in my opinion, very naive.
Was Dr. Mossadegh a crazy demagogue? No, but he did lead the movement
to nationalize Iran's oil industry. If Mousavi, as president,
were to strongly state that he would refuse to consider any surrender
of Iran's sovereign right to develop nuclear power for peaceful
energy purposes, that he would continue to support the resistance
organizations Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, that he
would continue to try and increase Iran's political role in the
Middle East, and that he would defend state ownership of the oil
and gas industries, would the Western media portray him as a reasonable
man?
Further,
there's the nature of Mousavi's election campaign. Obama called
it a “robust” debate, which it certainly was, and
a good refutation of the lie that Iran has no democracy. But it
is also a political movement, one capable of drawing large crowds
out into the streets, ready to engage in street battles with the
president's supporters and now the police.
Is it possible
that the U.S. government, its military and its 16 intelligence
agencies are piously standing on the sidelines of this developing
conflict, respecting Iran's right to work out its internal differences
on its own? Could we expect that approach from the same government
that still maintains its own 30-year sanctions against Iran, is
responsible for three sets of U.N.-imposed sanctions, annually
spends $70-90 million to fund “dissident” organizations
within Iran and, according to the respected investigative reporter
Seymour Hersh, actually has U.S. military personnel on the ground
within Iran, supporting terrorist organizations like the Jundallah
and trying to foment armed rebellions against the government?
The point
has been made that U.S. neocons were hoping for an Ahmadinejad
victory, on the theory that he makes a convenient target for Iran-bashers.
But the neocons are no longer in power in Washington. They got
voted out of office and are back to writing position papers for
right-wing think tanks. We now have a “pragmatic”
administration, one that would like to first dialog with the countries
it seeks to control.
I think what
is important to realize is that Washington wasn't just hoping
for a “reform” candidate to win the election –
it's been hoping for an anti-government movement that looks to
the West for its political and economic inspiration. Mousavi backer
and former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is a free-market
advocate and businessman whom Forbes magazine includes in its
list of the world's richest people. Does Rafsanjani identify with
or seek to speak for the poor? Does Mousavi?
What kind
of Iran are the Mousavi forces really hoping to create? And why
is Washington -- whose preference for “democracy”
is trumped every time by its insatiable appetite for raw materials,
cheap labor, new markets and endless profits -- so sympathetic
to the "reform" movements in Iran and in every other
country whose people have nationalized its own resources?
Would Iran
be better off with a president who, instead of qualifying everything
he says about the Holocaust, just came out directly and said,
“Look, there's no question that millions of Jewish people
were murdered in a campaign of genocide, but how does that justify
creating a Jewish state on land that is the ancestral home of
the Palestinians?” That would certainly make the job of
anti-war activists much easier -- and if you look hard enough,
you can find something close to those words in Ahmadinejad's statements.
But it wouldn't
be enough. The U.S. government and its complementary news media
would just find another hook on which to hang their demonization
of Iran and its government.
The days
ahead promise to be challenging ones for all those who oppose
war, sanctions and interference in the internal affairs of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. As we pursue that work, it would be
good not to get caught up in what is sure to be a tsunami of criticism
of a government trying to resolve a crisis that in all likelihood
is not entirely homegrown.
Phil
Wilayto is an author and activist based in Richmond, Virginia.
A co-founder of the Defenders for Freedom, Justice & Equality,
he edits that community organization's newspaper, The Richmond
Defender. He is a founding member of the Virginia Anti-War Network
and national board member of the Campaign Against Sanctions &
Military Intervention in Iran. In 2007 he organized a People's
Peace Delegation to Iran, a project that became the basis for
his latest book, In Defense of Iran: Notes from a U.S. Peace Delegation's
Journey through the Islamic Republic.
© 2009 Independent Media Institute. All rights reserved.
View this story online at: http://www.alternet.org/story/140636/
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